Designing a Double-Sided Auction Mechanism for eSAF

PtX Lab Position I 7/2026 I Thema: Aviation I 9 Pages

The PtX Lab Position Designing a Double-Sided Auction Mechanism for eSAF under the Sustainable Transport Investment Plan (STIP) analyses how a funding instrument for electricity-based sustainable aviation fuels (eSAF) should be designed: with centralised matching, standardised contracts and multi-year commitments. The authors clearly identify outstanding issues relating to low-carbon pathways, imported raw materials and long-term financing, rather than sidestepping them with vague formulations.

• At the heart of the position paper are five recommendations for the development of a two-sided auction mechanism:
• Core architecture as a scalable market instrument (not merely a demonstration signal): a central clearing house, standardised contracts, clear criteria, structured matching and multi-year budget commitments.
• Price as the key award criterion, supplemented in early rounds by strict project progress requirements and standardised tie-break criteria.
• Explicitly regulate pre-production funding (milestone-based or as a supplementary instrument), as the double-sided auction mechanism (DSA) alone does not close the upstream funding gap and would otherwise exclude smaller market participants.
• Clearly limit the funding framework to RFNBO-compliant eSAF; low-carbon approaches should only be considered in separate funding windows and from a dedicated funding pot.
• Do not exclude raw materials from third countries across the board, but require full transparency, traceability and harmonised protective measures.